Private Employers Can Dismiss Workers for Contacting Lawmakers

NASHVILLE (March 31) — In a binding decision issued March 27, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that private employers may lawfully terminate employees for petitioning state lawmakers, reaffirming that constitutional protections under both the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions apply only to government action—not to private companies.

The case, Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, centered on a former employee who was terminated after emailing State Rep. John Ragan, R-Oak Ridge, during a 2021 special legislative session. In her email, Smith urged lawmakers to intervene against her employer’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, requesting “legislative protection for … individual liberties and rights.” Rep. Ragan read the email aloud on the House floor, publicly linking it to ongoing policy discussions.

BlueCross BlueShield cited its internal social media and communication policy in her dismissal. Smith filed suit alleging retaliatory discharge, asserting that her termination violated her constitutional right to petition. A Hamilton County trial court dismissed the suit. The Tennessee Court of Appeals later reversed that ruling, but the Supreme Court accepted review and overturned the appellate decision.

Chief Justice Holly Kirby, writing for the majority, held that Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution, which affirms the right of citizens to apply to government for redress, “does not provide a basis for a retaliatory discharge claim against a private employer.” The opinion emphasized that constitutional rights function to restrict government power, not the conduct of private parties. “For hundreds of years,” Kirby wrote, “the constitutional right to petition has been considered a bulwark against government oppression, not a constraint on private entities.”

Tennessee law does recognize retaliatory discharge in limited contexts, such as whistleblower claims, workers’ compensation filings, and refusals to participate in illegal conduct. However, the court found that no existing statute or public policy shields private employees from termination solely for petitioning lawmakers and declined to extend such protection judicially.

Justice Sarah K. Campbell concurred with the ruling but cautioned that future exceptions should come through legislation, not judicial interpretation. “There are undoubtedly situations in which the termination of an employee would violate public policy,” she wrote. “But courts are not well-equipped to determine which public policies are sufficiently clear and important to warrant the strong remedy of a retaliatory discharge claim.”

The ruling confirms that in Tennessee, workers employed by private entities have no state constitutional protection when contacting lawmakers—regardless of the content, context, or public importance of their message. This is consistent with long-standing federal precedent. The First Amendment restricts only state action. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).

The decision also carries broader implications for Tennessee’s evolving governance model. As increasing public functions—education, health care, corrections—are outsourced to private actors, constitutional protections do not necessarily follow. Under current law, employees of charter schools, voucher-funded private institutions, or state-contracted health providers may face termination for policy advocacy without constitutional remedy.

No legislation is currently pending to expand speech-related discharge protections for private-sector workers in Tennessee.